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Abstract Given the transformation in the government of academic life over recent decades, the
article attempts to derive a political critique of the changing psychosocial conditions of academic
life via a historical juxtaposition with the nomos of the labour camp in Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag
Archipelago. The aim is to address the need to think beyond normative disciplinary power, to
explore a distinctly capitalist governmentality in relation to Foucault’s genealogy of power and to
elaborate the techniques and practices of an emergent ‘meta-disciplinary’ technology of labour
control in academia. Therefore, a broadly Foucauldian analysis on these questions will be
undertaken, and augmented with Marxian and post-Freudian insights into the role of capital
accumulation dynamics, in order to texture the conventional presentation of governmental
rationality. The result is a metonymic presentation of the ‘camp’ as a physiological structure of
capitalistModernity, whose imprint can be discerned in numerous social and institutional settings,
in this case Academia and the Gulag. From this outcome, insights into the transformation of living
and labouring in academia, and the effects on psychological and intellectual well-being stemming
from the new complex of control can be derived. The piece concludes with some thoughts on
strategies of intellectual survival in academia, on counter-conducted techniques of
subjectification and on possible means of resistance in the meta-disciplinary idiom.
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I want to suggest that exploitation within the contemporary Academy operates in and
through technologies of selfhood that are producing new kinds of labouring subject:
individualised, responsibilised, self-managing and monitoring, and increasingly carrying
their office or workplace ‘on board’ at all times in a mobile device. What kinds of critical
analysis can help us engage with this? (Gill 2014: 13).








We have been witnessing a transfiguration in the ways in which academic life is being
lived, and thus governed. These changes are apparently recognised, lamented and then
accepted. They are profoundly historical and political. Management in government,
bureaucracy, media and academia have been prosecuting ‘rapid and wholesale transfor-
mation of universities in recent years’ (Gill 2014: 17), reconstituting academic conditions
of labouring and living in a new conceptual axiomatic that we can provisionally call
‘Neoliberal’ (Lazzarato 2015). A governing rationality according to these axioms is
colonising our understandings of social, cultural and intellectual activities in the univer-
sity generally (Gill 2014: 17). These are activities, however, in which we are all
complicit (Gill 2014: 24; Saunders 2010: 60; Zuidhof 2015: 53), and as transformations
in academic life and labour they are having profound effects in particular on the
psychological and intellectual welfare of academic workers—the so-called ‘psychosocial
effects’ (Gill 2014: 22). Rosalind Gill rightly points out that these effects are rarely
discussed, and that despite the ‘interest in reflexivity in recent decades, the experiences
of academics have somehow largely escaped critical attention’ (Gill 2010: 229). These
experiences need to be voiced and articulated, they must be explored and ruminated
upon, and most crucially they should be imaginatively conceptualised toward the key
strategic question: how are we being governed?1
The justification therefore in choosing to speak of academia as the site of analysis for
the new modulations of labour control lies in the need to articulate and express experi-
ences in that environment. The initial motivation has not been to exemplify a general
modulation by means of select and focused analysis of the disciplinary technology of
labour in the academic setting, but the reverse, to theorise through the experienced
transfigurations in academic labour control so as to contextualise micro-social experi-
ences onto a broader macro-social and historical plane in order to make political sense of
quotidian experience.
I want to connect the transformations entailed in this governing rationality—and our
conative complicities by which we will our own enslavements in ‘passionate servitude’
(Lordon 2014: 17)—with the undertreated theme of ‘academics as workers’ and to look
for similar historical experiences or labouring conditions (Gill 2014: 18). This way, we
can texture our current understanding of those mechanisms of social control in academia
that apparently remain ‘frustratingly abstract and cryptically suggestive’ (New
Formations 2014). The ultimate significance of this analysis therefore resides not so
much in ‘breaking the silence’ (Gill 2010), as in mobilising historical isomorphy and
juxtaposition so as to better understand this silence in the direction of struggle in that
environment.
The ‘we’ to whom I refer would be all those for whom the psychosocial effects of which I
speak are of personal concern for their lives in the academicmilieu.My purposes here are not only
critical, and therefore neither normative nor properly scientific, but are an attempt to articulate
struggle against the powers that consign. The ‘we’ is not a categorical social formation that can be
easily identified in taxonomic social scientific terms, given the extreme diversity and range of
1 This was the direct question of the Governing Academic Life conference at the London School of Economics
(June, 2014), in parallel to which this article was written.
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academic institutions, cultures, funding arrangements, implicit social mandates, historical expe-
riences, formal organisation, etc., across the globe. I address rather all those in the university today
who recognise and are touched by what follows. This is likely the best shibboleth of a reader’s
inclusion in that most dubious of all structurally discrete positionalities: We.
The aim in my argument is to get beyond a rationality of labour and production that has overly
privileged disciplinary rationality as an idiom of coercion and a micro-somatic complex of
techniques as its principal mode. An essential theoretical point of departure is the sense that
‘contemporary mechanisms of government, regulation and administration must be understood as
operating according to different logics than the classic Bnormative^ mode of Bdisciplinary^ power’
(New Formations 2014). The Taylorist rationality of the factory is clearly inadequate (Hardt 2008:
8), and the typical institution of disciplinarity seems now an ‘empty fortress’ (Virilio 2006: 53).2
In this direction, Mary Evans has presaged our gradual induction into ‘a nightmare of a different
kind, in which the horrors of force, violence, physical coercion and hardship are replaced by the slow
suffocation of the spirit, the intellect and the capacity to resist’ (Evans 2004: 52). Following this
thought, the central idea I am therefore going to argue is over the fundamental movement in
intellectual labour discipline/control from ‘docile bodies’ to proactive bodies as part of the emergence
of a new globally strategic regime of accumulation in historical capitalism and themodality of power
through which this regime is being realised. By this we can begin a movement beyond the strictly
‘disciplinary’, and so open the skylight to a possible set of resistance strategies and reimaginings.
For the purposes of what follows, I assume no necessary discrimination between intellec-
tual and manual labour. It is in the objective alienation of labour via commodification,
publication, teaching activities, policy documents, reports, etc., and its indexing into ‘impact’
and quantifiable calculation, that renders intellectual labour just as material and real as manual
labour in the last analysis. Both entail an engagement with the material social metabolism; both
entail profound subjectification; both entail the realisation of surplus value; and both entail a
technology that draws on conative investments that evade any easy disentangling of the
manual and the intellectual. The channelling of surplus value turns out then to be not so
varied a phenomenon in capitalist society, when abstracted into these terms.
Whilst to speak of academic life and labour in general is to violate the great particularities
and diversities across the global landscape of university institutions, the analysis below
discusses an isomorphic relation running through tendencies manifest across the capitalist
core states.3 It is the apparent generality of the modern ‘camp’ structure throughout the
widespread features of transformation in universities that betrays a nomos, and it is this nomos
with which I am concerned here.
Academic or intellectual labour arguably differs from contemporary manual work (i.e.
garment workers) in the latter’s clearer continuity within the ‘disciplinary sites’ of control (i.e.
factory), and the former’s genealogical shift into the camp rationality. Another point of
presenting academia, and labouring therein, as a particular materialisation of the camp, is
not to claim any unique status but both to perform an implicit immanent critique of the claims
made for ‘neoliberalisation’ and to articulate a desire for struggle in that setting that seems
increasingly acute amongst many academic labourers today.
2 Incidentally, Stakhanovitism is an equally unsatisfactory characterisation of emergent academic labour forms,
entailing as it did worker solidarity, mutual inspiration, space for spontaneous autonomy, and a certain politically
critical trajectory (Thurston 1993: 142, 146). These features were also utterly alien to living and working in
Gulag. Moreover, Stakhanovite labour techniques were a variation on a theme of Taylorism.
3 This article is based on experiences at the University of Helsinki, and so the discussion that follows is not just an
Anglo-American experience but something brought out starkly everywhere by austerity politics in recent years.
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This article then engages with three basic challenges: (1) to take a broadly Foucauldian
analysis on these questions beyond the strictly disciplinary idiom that has dominated thinking
on the governing of academic life4; (2) to broaden the theoretical discussion of technologies,
techniques and practices of control and governmentality with historical, geographical or actual
exemplary instantiations; and (3) to attempt to expand the prevalent diagnostic register into a
more explicitly political exploration of the ‘conditions of possibility’ for struggle in the
academic domain of labouring and living.
Camp: A Rhizomatic Resurfacing
Just as a return to Discipline and Punish is necessary to cast critical light upon the later
Lectures on Governmentality, it is by returning to Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago that I
think a critical reappraisal of the government of academia becomes possible in a way that gets
beyond the disciplinary and into the Nomos des Lagers that is capitalist governmentality.
Giorgio Agamben’s celebrated study established Homo Sacer as the subject of sovereign
power generated in a peculiarly modern paradoxical and interstitial terrain of ‘bare life’ (1998).
The structural constellation that has been decisive in the creation of the zone of this subject of
‘bare life’ has been the generalised strategic form of ‘camp’. I want similarly to mobilise the
camp, but in a slightly different direction: camp as a metonym of capitalist governmentality.
By this, I am also attempting to explore the camp as a ‘hidden matrix’ and ‘Bnomos^ of the
modern’ (Agamben 1998: 166), but, unlike Agamben, I wish to bring out, not so much its
‘juridico-political structure’, as its meta-disciplinary physiology, always in motion, similar to
Paul Virilio’s dromological view of modernity as a ‘vast camp’ (2006: 54).
The succinct metonymic presentation of the prison-to-labour-camp movement is a highly
pertinent, if rather contentious, poetic means of presenting the transfigurations, their operative
practices and techniques. Although such a historical analysis might appear to be tenuously
remote, the ‘history of various forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling
our certitudes and dogmatism than is abstract criticism’ (Foucault 2002: 323). This is not a rash
analogical move, but builds on an extant academic discourse that draws out tropes and themes
of authoritarian and totalitarian exempla, in order to critique current transformations in
academia (Amann 2003; Burleigh 2003: 12; Docherty 2011: 118; Evans 2004: 35–36;
Geiger 2004: 243; Lorenz 2012: 600, 622). However, in this procedure, we must avoid the
anachronistic and ‘simple transposition of historical moulds’, aiming rather to ‘let the knowl-
edge of the past work on the experience of the present’ (Foucault 2010: 130–131).
Complementary to this research that parallels Soviet bureaucracy with New Public
Management (NPM) in academia today is the work coming principally out of anthropological
studies on ‘audit culture’ (Baert and Shipman 2005; Shore 2008; Strathern 2000) and techno-
networked surveillance (Callon and Law 2005; Gill 2014: 22–24). These focus on quantifica-
tion, calculation and the creation of indices as diagrammatic techniques and apparatuses for
governing transformative ‘massification’, commodification, global migration and shifting
capital distribution across the world’s higher education landscape. With their penetrative
colonisation of Lifeworlds and potential to transform subjectivities in the workplace, they
4 Whilst this work began from an interest in early Frankfurt social theory, and instrumental reason in academic
ranking particularly, this article has been confined to Foucault’s genealogy of power for reasons of space and
clarity. A critical theoretical analysis that engages with Frankfurt theorists shall be forthcoming elsewhere.
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are key strategic devices in the transfiguration of academic life. However, these techniques of
governmentality are somewhat different from the nomos of the ‘camp’ in particular, and its
meta-disciplinary techniques, which is the main concern of my argument here.5
With these literatures in mind, we must therefore think imaginatively on how the neoliberal
transformation of academia, that is claimed to open up a previously cloistered and unresponsive
space to social accountability, transparency, and competitiveness, is actually generative of the
Society of Control (Deleuze 1992), wherein Poulantzas’ ‘peculiarly modern phenomenon’ of
totalitarian rationality inheres to capitalist Modernity as a recurrently instantiated historical ratio-
nality in the mode of production (2014: 107). In the very marrow of this saturating and penetrative
totalitarianism lies a movement from the Sovereign’s right to ‘take life and let live’ to a rationality
driven by the logos of a vocational ‘let die and make live’, a genealogical movement toward a
deepening and intensifying mobilisation of populations and the ‘collective individuals’ that consti-
tute them (Foucault 2007: 42). This means that, despite an undoubted genealogy of power and
coercion at work in the contemporary emergence of new forms and mechanisms, we must not rule
out the historical surfacing of the rationality elsewhere and elsewhen in capitalist Modernity.
The great Soviet misadventure was just as much a striation on the historical plane of capitalist
modernity as anywhere else, bound as it was to the spatio-temporal totality of capitalist relations, its
rhythms and tempos, its imperatives and logic, and its isomorphic segmentarity of ‘one world
market, the capitalist one’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 530). Its ultimate demise was ‘in no way a
victory for capitalism; it was merely the breakdown for one of the forms capitalism takes’ (Invisible
Committee 2009: 66). There is no exclusive royal road of teleological necessity that takes us from
Marxism to Totalitarianism, as posited by the likes of André Glucksmann (1975), and such
historical linearity is profoundly dubious especially when it shields capitalist social relations from
any compromising associations. It is therefore crucial to realise that ‘it may be that older means of
control’, dismissed from analysis as passé, will ‘come back into play, adapted as necessary’
(Deleuze 1995: 182), resurfacing on the plane of History, and once more erupting on the
morphonomic cartography of historical capitalism. Having said this, we must evade historicist
reductionism and realise that ‘the Gulag is not a residue or a sequel of the past: it is a positive
present’ (Foucault 1980: 136), and as such it is on present strategies and tactics of coercion that we
must ultimately focus. Consideration of the past merely helps us to think critically on the present.
It is essential to note at this point that prior analyses and comparison with Gulag in studies
of disciplinarity (1970s–1980s) revolved around the contemporary crisis of western Marxism
(Foucault 1980: 134–145), and so failed to view the camps seriously as a set of instantiations
of a capitalist axiomatic. My explorations therefore ought not to be dismissed as another
scholarly ploughing of the historical rubble. What we are dealing with is a kind of rhizomatic
archaeology of capitalist practices that can resurface in varied modern settings wherever the
rationality or discursive conditions are formed.
From Prison…
Bless you, prison, for having been in my life!
(Solzhenitsyn 2007b: 617).
5 An article treatment of diagrammatic mapping and arborescent tracing in academic rankings, as a component of
the broader ‘audit culture’, will be forthcoming as ‘Mapping Academics: Tracing the Ranking Regime in
Historical Capitalism’.
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To Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet prison cell was a place of reflection and contemplation. Just as the
cynic in his barrel, the monk in his cell or the Faustian scholar in his study have sought to labour in
the ascetic seclusion of institutional isolation, so has the prison often served to grant an intellectual
experience both illuminating and fruitful, capable of nourishing the ‘profound rebirth of a human
being’ (2007b: 604). This has been an implicit quality of the principle of the modern prison, as well
as an explicit quality of numerous concrete historical visions of the penitentiary concept, such as at
Pennsylvania’s legendary Eastern State Penitentiary. Howmany artists, intellectuals or radicals have
ruminated in imprisonment, and in so doing come to realise truths denied them amidst the smoke
(τύφoς), and the ephemeral stimuli of everyday life? Boethius, Gramsci, Grotius, Lenin,
Dostoyevsky, De Sade, Pisarev, Wilde, London, Emma Goldman and Solzhenitsyn himself.
Tolstoy ‘dreamed of being put in prison’ and ‘actually needed prison as a drought needs a shower
of rain!’ (2007b: 616). For such survivors of the Gulag labour camps as Varlam Shalamov, ‘ascent,
growth in profundity, the development of human beings, is possible in prison’, whereas the labour
camps of Gulag were ‘in every way schools of the negative’ (Shalamov 1994: 411). Likewise, for
Yevgenia Ginzburg, ‘prison ennobled people, while camp corrupted’ (quoted in Solzhenitsyn
2007b: 619; Ginzburg 1975), whilst simultaneously Luchenetsky waxed lyrical that, just as
‘darkness renders a person more sensitive to light’, so ‘involuntary inactivity in imprisonment
arouses in him [the prisoner] a thirst for life, movement, work’ (quoted in Solzhenitsyn 2007b: 605).
To Luchenetsky, ‘the quiet compels profound pondering over his own BI^, over surrounding
conditions, over his own past and present, and forces him to think about his future’. Prison changes
a person, and though ‘one can certainly debate whether this is good for revolution’, or indeed the
bank balance or physical health, ‘these transformations always proceed in the direction of deepening
the soul’ (2007b: 604), or so Solzhenitsyn claimed for the political prisoner, unwittingly repeating
the legitimations of Enlightenment disciplinarity.
The prison has therefore a long and esteemed place, amongst those (un)fortunate enough to
have experienced such a sobering period of their lives, that ranks it as a potentially edifying
and enlightening event in the dialectical journey of life. Though confined within four stout
walls, locked away from the fresh air and daylight, denied a freedom of movement sometimes
down to the extent of an arm outstretched, the inner recesses of thought are relatively
untouched. The body might be disciplined, manipulated and made the focus of harsh somatic
coercion, but thinking and the attention of the ‘soul’ are left relatively to their own initiatives,
despite the intention of disciplinary power ‘to reach something other than the body itself’
(Foucault 1991a: 11). As we shall see, the docility of the imprisoned body would often be
matched by the frenetic and individual activity of the mind. This cannot be said of the labour
camp, where the opposite was all too common, and where the productive canalisation of
libidinal investments proved a more potent bypass of dissent.
If these sentiments come across as too Platonic, romantic or even too Russian, it is also true to
note that when not in solitary cells prison in Stalin’s USSR was also an agonistic place of
contestation and argument—‘it was a time for sharp arguments, as well’ (2007a: 216)—in amanner
often not dissimilar to the Senior Common Room argument, or formal university disputation.6 In
6 The preponderance of testimony here from ‘intellectuals’ amongst the political prisoners is not simply a
function of their greater tendency to put experience into memoir. Whilst I recognise the irony of relying upon
intellectuals’ testimony for my argument, it could be claimed that it is precisely the parallels in the experience of
intellectuals who laboured and lived in the historic Gulag with the living of intellectual labourers in the current
academic context that are relevant. The point is to bring out the effects of ‘camp’ as a resurfacing nomos and
technological complex of labour control on the activity of intellectual labour. It is therefore in reference to
intellectual activity in Gulag that the pertinence of the metonym is established.
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this case, for Solzhenitsyn, the enforced leisure, combined with the crowded proximity to other
cellmates all day and everyday, cellmates of a dozen nations, creeds and political convictions,
generated a degree of discussion, both speculative and mundanely political, entirely unfamiliar out
there in ‘Freedom’. These were ‘others like yourself, doomed to the same fate’ (2007a: 180); they
were ‘people to listen to and people with whom to compare notes’ (2007a: 190). The corporate
sense of being part of an almost collegial band of fellow travellers and dissertational interlocutors
amongst these political prisoners (and the prison of which these writers speak was invariably an
imprisonment either of isolation or alongside fellow politicals) really does shine through
Solzhenitsyn’s prison experience (2007a: 183).
Interrogation still hung over me, but how far it had retreated! Tomorrow I would be
telling them my story (though not talking about my case, of course) and they would be
telling me their stories too. How interesting tomorrow would be, one of the best days of
my life! (Thus, very early and very clearly, I had this consciousness that prison was not
an abyss for me, but the most important turning point in my life) (2007a: 187).
Anne Applebaum rightly points out that prisoners were able to fight back and resist the
disciplinary techniques of the Soviet prison. There was greater solidarity in the prison than
later in the camps where the authorities would more effectively ‘divide and rule with greater
ease’ through a rationality of order that mobilised the techniques of temptation and promise as
much as through prohibitive coercion (Applebaum 2003: 154). Likewise, prison made ‘polit-
icals’ of all the prisoners in a structured anatomy of control where ‘all were more or less equal’
(2003: 154), as opposed to the enforced apparatus of differentiation and dynamic hierarchy
later in the physiology of camps. As will be clarified further down, disciplinary power entails a
surplus that engenders its own counter-conduct, just as the threat to sovereignty in the
spectacle of public punishment creates its own reflexive challenge in the spectacular judicial
act itself of sovereign power exercised on the body of the condemned (Foucault 1991a: 73).
However, later in camp we will see how any such surplus would be swiftly appropriated,
redirected and channelled into productive activity, and the private, disputational or insurrec-
tional moment of surplus annihilated. All this is not to say that prison was not a terrible
experience: slop buckets, punishment cells, stool pigeons, interrogations, confined spaces,
enforced idleness, rank air, constant surveillance, brutality, cold and damp. The daily existence
of the prisoners was subject to all the quasi-panoptic surveillance and control one would expect
of the disciplinary institution of prison. Solzhenitsyn mentions the regular and frequent guard’s
eye at the peephole in the great Sukhanovka, where the prisoner was left not ‘a single moment
for sleep, not a single stolen moment for privacy. You were always being watched and always
in their power’ (2007a: 183). Similarly, there is the constant internal relocation of prisoners
from cell to cell (2007a: 209–210, 535; Applebaum 2003), and the authorities’ use of the
‘Nazedka’ [stool pigeon, informant] (2007a: 185; Applebaum 2003). The prisoners thus
undoubtedly existed under the panoptic gaze of the unseen inspector and were disciplined
through the enforced spatial disposition of their bodies rendered docile.
However, for many people, prison had at least the potential to edify intellectually, satisfy
socially and nourish aesthetically. In intellectual terms, there was a freedom and a scope for
‘moral ascent’ through thought and the ethically rigorous behaviour of the refusal (such as
refusing to confess, to inform on others, or by keeping mentally active through calculating the
circumference of the Earth!). There was a space for ethical practice and Enkrateia. This is the
modernist Kantian freedom as autonomy, an ‘intellectual and moral autonomy’ (Zaretsky
2005: 163). I claim that, squeamishness at the comparison aside, work in the university has had
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much in common with the characteristics of this institutional setting. Through the figurative
but historical prison comparison, I am talking of the idea of ‘universities as spaces of
[interpersonal] openness, intellectual freedom and collegiality’ (Gill 2014: 24).
What this is to say, is that there is much in common here with the cellular, but corporate,
quality to work traditionally in the disciplined academy. Academics have rarely been moti-
vated by monetary gain. To work in disciplinary conditions, even when in the form of the
‘force, violence, physical coercion and hardship’ alluded to above by Evans, the activity of the
intellect is not harmed, and arguably even stimulated and supported. Researchers, scholars and
students have for long become accustomed to working to deadlines, consigned to labouring
spaces, in cramped conditions, under-resourced and intensively examined—to name but a few
techniques of academic labour discipline.
Indeed, the inclination to become an academic (particularly in the social sciences and the
humanities) generally involved a temperament and personality content with long periods
of social isolation and highly individualized work (Evans 2004: 119).
These disciplinary conditions elicit complaint, but are often quite tolerable for many academic
labourers for whom physical comfort, luxury, monetary remuneration and unconstrained personal
conditions have often played second fiddle to more vocational and aesthetic priorities. They
certainly do not engender misery, and the ‘slow suffocation of the spirit, the intellect, and the
capacity to resist’ that are proliferating aspects of the new ‘nightmare of a different kind’.
Nevertheless, there is a crucial technical problemwith prison, and the disciplinary rationality
beyond it, within the historical morphology of capitalism in its proximity to the social
metabolism. This is a problem of the technē of the social system and is summed up in a passage
in Volume Two in the middle of Solzhenitsyn’s musing on prison as a part of Soviet society. He
remarks ‘but what if one has nothing to repent of—what then, what then does the prisoner think
about all the time? BPoverty and prison… give wisdom^. They do. But—where is it to be
directed?’ (2007b: 602) This is the crucial insight. Such activity might well be intellectually
enriching and vital for the ascent of the intellectual soul… but it is not productive!7
… To Labour Camp
There a convict learns to hate work. He does not and cannot learn anything else. He learns
flattery, lying, petty acts and major villainies. He becomes totally engrossed in himself
(Shalamov 1994: 411).
Bruno Bettelheim’s analysis from his own experiences in Nazi captivity led him to
conclude that ‘to spend time in prison does not produce the character changes described in
this paper [camp]’ (1943: 446). Quintessentially, the camp was an infinitely more effective
‘means of producing changes in the prisoners which will make them more useful subjects of
the Nazi state’ (Bettelheim 1943: 419). What we see in the metamorphosis from prison to
labour camp is essentially a genealogically accretional shift in the technology of labour control
from the disciplinary creation of docile bodies to the generation of proactive bodies, from the
‘formation of habits’ to the ‘mobilisation of energy’ (Rancière 2012: 31).
7 ‘The same could be said about Taylorism. The system of Taylorism was an extraordinary invention by an
engineer who wanted to combat laziness and everything that slows down production. But one can still ask: did
Taylorism ever really work?’ (Foucault 1980: 162). Well, the answer is, not directly.
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Virilio was right that ‘the precious lesson of the camps and the gulags has not been heeded,
because it was erroneously presented not only as an ideological phenomenon, but also as a
static one, an enclosure’ (Virilio 2006: 98). In short, a disciplinary view has prevailed over a
governmental. The first volume of The Gulag Archipelago (‘The Prison Industry’) comes in
the form of a social anatomy, exploring chapter by chapter the various discrete organs and
tissue structures of Gulag: the Arrest, the Cell, the Interrogation, the Bluecaps (police) and the
metastatic cartography of the Archipelago itself. In Volume 2, however, we get a social
physiology, Gulag as a system, dynamic, nomological and ‘in perpetual motion’.
For Solzhenitsyn, the labour camp (Gulag) was a matter entirely different from the prison,
and at the centre of this difference lies ‘the leading idea of the Archipelago—forced labour’
(2007b: 10), derived from the motivation ‘to get from the camps as much economic profit and
production and labour as possible’ (2007b: 392–393). Soul destroying, immiserating, alienat-
ing, crushing, the labour camp stripped all who were processed through it of any shred of
dignity, where ‘man is wolf to man’ (Bardach 2003), inexorably destroying human life in the
‘sewage system’ of the Soviet Union as a social system.
The Gulag Archipelago is replete with references to camp-prison comparisons. The basic
message is simple, that ‘in comparison with prison our camps are poisonous and harmful’ and it
was ‘really hopeless to stand fast in camp’ (2007b: 605). Quoting and commenting on
Bettelheim’s parallel experiences in Nazi captivity, Eli Zaretsky seems to identify a similar notion.
The theme of Bettelheim’s memoir is the survival of the individual personality in an
environment aimed at destroying it. ‘According to the well-known ideology of the Nazi
state’, Bettelheim wrote, ‘the individual as such is either nonexistent or of no impor-
tance’. The camp was set up ‘to break the prisoners as individuals’ (Zaretsky 2005: 283).
But there is something vital (literally) missing in all this. Gulag camps were labour camps, not
extermination camps. That annihilation was achieved through labour, through the perverse formula
Arbeit macht Frei. It is not the manner in which individuals were destroyed, body and soul, but the
manner in which they were ‘made live’ that has valence. Further, it is not the simple fact that the
camps entailed (forced) labour over the (enforced) leisure of prison that is important. It is rather the
way in which this labour was obtained, and through the apparatuses of forced labour how certain
effects regarding power and control were realised, such as the accretional move from compulsion to
impulsion, through ‘technologies of self-hood’ (Gill 2014), that cannot be adequately understood
through the lens of anatomical disciplinary power. These weremechanisms that often impinged less
on the physical freedom of the body, physical constraint beingmarkedly lessmanifest than in prison
(and sometimes absent altogether). It is this transformation of incarceration, from prison to camp,
how this move was enmeshed in physiological imperatives of production and biopolitical repro-
duction, and what effects this new governmental technology of labour had on individuals ‘souls’,
that is relevant as a comparative for a similar modality of Modernity resurfacing in academic labour
today within the meta-disciplinary institution of the university.
In the Panopticon each person, depending on his place, is watched by all or certain of the
others. You have an apparatus of total and circulating mistrust, because there is no
absolute point. The perfected form of surveillance consists in a summation of
malveillance (Foucault 1980: 158).
This was very true in camp and serves well to connect discipline to government through a
meta-disciplinary genealogical moment. But Gulag was not a mere open-air panopticon; it was
a society of beings, or rather an economy of beings, in which a new improvised penal ‘art of
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government’ had to be established by authority and corresponding ‘practices of the self’ had to
be conjured and realised by the ingenious sons and daughters of Gulag in order to survive, not
merely as bodies, but as souls.
Beyond Discipline: A New Modality of Power?
The socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception,
would have to be categorical and to describe what is already in the process of substitution
for the disciplinary sites of enclosure, whose crisis is already proclaimed (Deleuze 1992: 7).
So the Gulag has been touched on before in studies of disciplinarity. More broadly, there
has been a crossover in critical institutional analysis from prison to educational institutions and
practices ever since Discipline and Punish (1975). However, we must get beyond this to the
so-called ‘power at a distance’ (Gill 2014: 22), from the strictly disciplinary rationality that is
bound to a somatic microphysics and its institutional social infrastructure as somewhere we
have ceased decisively to be already in the era of Post-War Fordism (Deleuze 1992: 3). A key
aim here is to show that the elements or moments of the Society of Control, those ‘metastable
states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation’
(Deleuze 1992: 5), are not historically a straight morphological product of the post-Fordist era,
but have been a latent genealogical vector of modern capitalist rationality throughout.
So what is crucially fruitful here is not any conventional political scientific or
empirical comparative analysis, but the kind of exploration that seeks to illuminate the
subterranean eruptions of the rationality of capitalist governmentality, those rhizomatic
instantiations of what Nico Poulantzas noted to be a ‘peculiarly modern phenomenon’
that possesses neither historical necessity nor teleological linearity. It has neither clear
historical crystallisation nor smooth emergence, but rather strategically or tactically
resurfaces here and there in various discursive and institutional settings. Supplementary
to the disciplinarity instantiated in, but not limited to, the technology of Gulag, there is
also instantiated a capitalist governmentality as a distinct, but not discrete, modality of
power that works through, alongside and beyond disciplinary power. This is no rupture
or break with disciplinary power, but an unevenly accretional and augmenting move-
ment. Should we speak of a ‘further disciplinarity’,8 rather than any break into a new
modality of power? Foucault’s movement from the panoptic inspector to the physiology
of ‘malveillance’ sketched above brings out the ‘meta-’ of further-disciplinary tech-
niques, practices and apparatuses.
First, we must understand what is meant by the move from ‘sovereignty’ and ‘discipline’ to
‘government’. By governmental rationality, or Governmentality, is meant an ‘ensemble formed
by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics’ (Foucault 2007:
108). It is exercised as a power that has a ‘population as its target, political economy as its
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security [physiological regulation] as its
essential technical instrument’. So, rather than simply an anatomic-somatic microphysics, this
is a power for which population—‘a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally
and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live’
8 I have more thoroughly treated the notion of ‘Meta-Disciplinarity’ elsewhere (Welsh 2016).
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(Foucault 2007: 21)—is the most pertinent level of life at which governmental rationality is
concerned, and government itself is conducted.
In the genealogy of modern modalities of power that Foucault builds throughout
his corpus, we are led historically from the power of the Sovereign, through individ-
uating disciplinary power employed somatically in panoptic institutions such as the
asylum, prison, barracks and school, finally to the ‘age of security’, and ‘Man-as-
Species’ as the regulated object of this governmental power (Foucault 2003: 242).
According to Foucault’s historical genealogy, in contrast to the Sovereign’s power that
characterised the early-modern territorial-fiscal state, a field of activity began to
coalesce in the 18th Century out of the crisis of Mercantilism. This field of activity
is the ‘economy’ and constitutes the core of the (Neo-)Liberal problematic: ‘how the
overall exercise of political power can be modelled on the principles of a market
economy’ and how ‘formal principles of a market economy’ can be ‘projected on to a
general art of government’ (Foucault 2010: 131). The form of political power most
relevant to this broadly conceived domain of ‘political economy’ was no longer
simply the exercise of power by the Sovereign, but the intervention of ‘government’
in the collective life of the population—hence governmentality—and the object of this
power was no longer the Sovereign’s subject, but the population itself, its continuity
and its well being.
As Silvia Federici points out, the interiorisation of the mechanisms of power through
disciplinary micro-physical techniques is merely the first movement of control that secures
the ‘collaboration of the Self’ in a modality of power ‘diffused and decentred through the
social body’ (Federici 2004: 149). It is as though the disciplinarity of prison is merely a
pedagogical and preparatory moment of transformation on the road to the authentically modern
destination of the ‘self-management’ so central to a bourgeois subjectivity (Federici 2004:
149). However, the need for techniques of coercive control inherent to the accumulative
imperatives of capitalist social relations renders the realisation of this subjectivity perpetually
imperfect.
Within the population in governmentality, there is the need for an individuating function in
the modality of power. The given population cannot be governed, and the field of political
economy cannot be intervened in, without the mereonomic establishment of individuals within
the population and a particular characterisation of the social relations between them, that is, the
necessary social ‘depths and details’ of objectification (Foucault 1980: 101). Thus, in a way
that is accretional rather than successive, the role of individuating somatic disciplinary power
is preserved, augmented and transfigured, dovetailed into the new modality of ‘government’
(Foucault 1991b: 102).
In Foucault’s genealogy of power modalities from the disciplinary to the governmental,
the crucial threshold consists of a movement from concern with creation and reform of
the individual to a concern with the ever-greater efficacy in securing the well-being of a
population, a formal population without essential definition or substantive content. In the
pastoral objective inherent to the government of population, the ‘collective individuals’
that constitute its operative depths and details—for population conceptually presupposes
constitutive individuals and vice-versa—are ‘simply instrumental’ in the final analysis
(Foucault 2007: 42). What this world-historic 19th century shift in the modalities of
power entails is then a subtle, but vital, movement from the Sovereign’s negative
prerogative power ‘to take life or let live’ to the positive Biopower to ‘make live and
let die’ (Foucault 2003: 241). This genealogical shift does not manifest as a temporally
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phased succession, but emerges as an imbrication and overlapping, a ‘dovetailing’ as
Foucault termed it (Foucault 2003: 242):
This technology of power […] does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does
dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of
infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques.
The subject-individuating power of the disciplinary rationality that functions by
neutralising, disabling, threatening, compelling, obviating, rendering passive and excluding
into inertia (docility and malleability) needs now to be augmented by dynamic apparatuses that
operationalise and incentivise the ‘collective individual’ through impulsion, mobilisation,
blackmail, tease, temptation, reward, etc., but which regardless still coerce in some manner
‘at a distance’ and by an averted gaze.
All this is to say that what has been happening is an alteration of emphasis from the
disciplinary gaze to the mobilising and rewarding mechanisms in biopolitical governmentality,
functioning not by disciplinary instruction or command in the ‘form of the prohibition, Byou
must not do this^’ (Foucault 2007: 66), nor via the Sovereign’s ‘imposition of a law that says
no’. Instead, we have a disposition of techniques that engender impulsions to achieve, seek
reward, gain approval, aspire, succeed and excel, along with the practical compulsions in the
case of academia to acquire accreditation and symbolic qualification, that are brought to bear
on the individual in the process of her biopolitical delimitation and definition in the academic
knowledge-complex. The problem arises (more further down) if we question the mutual
benefit and betterment, or normative neutrality, that is claimed by neo-liberal Foucauldians
of this pastoral modality of government as some kind of evolution out of positive
disciplinarity.
Capitalist Governmentality: A Transformative Vertex
In order to grasp fully the transfigurations in meta-disciplinarity discussed so far, the
imperative logic that drives these practices, and their recurrent emergence in historical
time, must be identified. There is an historical asymmetry here that belies any claim
to an internally undifferentiated and normative governmentality of life in the
biopolitical community. There is a fundamental social and temporal motor at work,
driving the individuating function of meta-disciplinarity and its mereological appara-
tuses in a given population, and a logic that entails the figurative and real destruction
of lives in that biopolitical multiplicity in the furtherance and successful continuity of
Life. That something is axiomatic capitalism.
The normative conceptualisation of the biopolitical population often mobilised out
of Foucault’s Lectures seems to offer an unjustifiably homeostatic and autonomous
entity that is symmetrical in its totality. The governmental rationality that inheres to
the biopolitical regulation of life, and its apparatuses, does not function simply
according to an abstract teleological dynamic toward the maintenance of Life itself
and the simple survival of the biopolitical population at all costs. This would just be
an unstriated plane of immanence, bereft of any dynamic structure or ‘lines of
stratification’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 22), denying us any analytical explanation
for what is happening beyond the ahistorical. A capitalist logic works within this
governmental rationality, as a stratum-generating ‘tracing’ on the Body-without-
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Organs,9 if you will, a phenomenon of accumulation and extraction of useful labour
(Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 184). Perhaps, so as not to be implausibly paradigmatic
about this, we might say it works (simultaneously?) through governmentality, produc-
ing spatially and generating historically the particularities of its concrete operations
and instantiations. Ought we then speak of a capitalist governmentality?
If discipline is the subject-individuating mode, it is the dynamic imperative of capital
accumulation that supplies the driving motor of individuation, establishing the multiplicity
out of the totality of the biopolitical population. In mereological terms, the immanent plane of
capitalist accumulation requires the realisation of spatio-temporal asymmetries of identity and
difference to reconfigure and reproduce the dynamic infrastructure and differential flows
internal to the biopolitical population. These membranes and penumbrae, differential barriers
and limits, and variety in media are essential for the dynamic continuity of capitalist repro-
duction, as they simultaneously reconstitute the necessary depths and details of individuation
within the population as a whole. The logic of axiomatic capitalism provides the idiomatic
tracings of the capitalist socius by which the stratum of the particular is raised out of the plane
of the general, in the absence of which there would be no motion, no differentiation and no
individuation, and thus no biopolitical population. It is the logic of capital accumulation, and
its thirst for ever-more production and growth, that motivates the internal structuring of a
population so necessary for there to be an object of governmental rationality at all. In this way,
there has been historically no normative governmentality, just capitalist governmentality.
In tandem with the economically productive imperative agenda of camp, there was a
secondary and explicitly political agenda, destruction; destruction of dissent, organisation,
consciousness; destruction of a class; a class that does not fit into the schema of orthodox
Marxist theory, but a class nevertheless. Remember, a class, as a set of social relations, is just a
dialectical sublation out of a capitalist mode of production, whereby ‘mode of production’ is
taken as a social formation rather than as a specific orchestration of means of production with
labour (Harvey 2006: 25–26fn). Whilst the Gulag was profoundly capitalist, it was also a
historically particular emanation of a capitalist mode of production and therefore engendered a
class formation particular to it—the Zeks.10 The camps were ‘invented for destruction’ (2007b:
7), and large parts of Solzhenitsyn’s Volume Two are given over to a graduation of the
Archipelago from the older disciplinary agenda of ‘correction through labour’ to the transfor-
mative political agenda of ‘destruction through labour’ (2007b: 75–76). This is especially so in
the part titled ‘The Destructive-Labor Camps’, a title Solzhenitsyn defends for ‘that’s how we
felt them on our pelts’ (2007b: 145). This is the other (political) half to the story of camps built
to mobilise productive (baldly economic) potential. Bettelheim too recalls camp as a ‘labora-
tory’ that made slaves of people by a programmatic ‘disintegration from their position as
autonomous individuals’ (1943: 451–452). Thus, it was that the system of Corrective Labor
Camps ‘was a more effective means of destroying the intelligentsia than was prison. It was
precisely the intelligentsia that this system killed off quickly and completely’ (2007b: 631).
9 The Body-without-Organs is a substrate identified as the ‘plane of consistency’. It is a ‘non-formed, non-
organized, non-stratified or destratified body or term’ and is ‘opposed to the organizing principles that structure,
define and speak on behalf of the collective assemblage of organs, experiences or states of being’ (Message 2010:
37–8).
10 In similar vein, Solzhenitsyn claimed the Zeks to be a nation, rather than a class. Perhaps this is a result of the
growing pull exercised upon him by a conservative nostalgia for the 19th century. However, his treatment was
bound into an immanent critique of Stalin’s theorising of nations and nationalism, which I believe heavily
influenced his of choice of ‘national’ classification for the zeks in The Gulag Archipelago.
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In academia too, the emergent technology of labour control is first to correct, and failing
this to destroy, dissent and recalcitrance in the event of any divergence in conative alignment
from the semio-techniques of camp control. Camp was tasked with destroying dissent,
disobedience and potential opposition; with destroying the political and mobilising the eco-
nomic; with fabricating biopolitical ‘collective individuals’—passive, proactive, and expend-
able. In academia, this equates with those who do not reproduce the instrumental rationality,
who address counterproductive and irrelevant research questions, who do not reproduce
through intellectual activity ‘the daily structural violence of capitalism’ (Hardt and Negri
2005, 150; Harvey 2006: 32) by their refusal to play the publication game or to endorse and
collaborate in assessment and measurement exercises. The camps in the Soviet Union were
destructive instruments of comprehensive political, social and economic transformation with
the destruction of intellectually recalcitrant individuality as its raison d’être.
Taking the economically productive and politically destructive agendas together, ‘camp’
then functioned as a strategic vertex of transformation in the productive complex or regime of
accumulation that was the Soviet Union emergent under Stalin, a regime that engendered the
rise to hegemonic position of a new political class of administrators, police and party
functionaries, and operated through the regulatory ‘police’ apparatuses and disciplinary
techniques/practices outlined in this article. As the Soviet Union struggled to satisfy the law
of combined development (Trotsky 1972: 5, 300), the exigencies of governing a population in
tumult, war, revolution and mass-migration, and the need to massively expand the productive
forces of the socialist society, it was the camp that emerged as the principal instrument of
capital accumulation and governmentality in the absence of sufficiently developed productive
technique. Today, in the prolonged spatio-temporal ‘switching crises’ of capital accumulation
in the global core states (Harvey 2006: 428–429; 2010: 93), the ‘neoliberalisation’ of academia
into the university-as-camp assemblage serves a similar function in the post-industrial idiom of
semiotic financial capitalism. Naturally, a similar political eradication of non-productive
(instrumentally reproductive) elements, and an expansion in administrators and accountants
of the ‘police science’, will be necessary for the economic transformation to carry through,
which is of course what we have been witnessing for years now.
So in a dialectical sense, camp was at once a vanguard formation of the new social order that
metastasised from the prison as historical fragment and a coalescent effect of strategic crisis in the
hitherto (anaemic) dominant model of capital accumulation. Crucially, the historic creation of this
vertex, and the strategic project of class-power of which it was a constituent, entailed the
destruction of extant social and political formations in the meat-grinder of camp life and labour.
We are witnessing something similar in the university. The ongoing crisis of the dominant model
of accumulation that is neoliberal capitalism, the contemporary exigencies of ‘spatio-temporal
fix’ and ‘massified’ global migration, the emergence of immaterial, symbolic and affective forms
of capital and labour, has necessitated the generation of disciplinary and governmental appara-
tuses in a new regime of accumulation. Like the Gulag, the university is being transmogrified into
a strategic vertex of social relations to take on the transformative and vanguard political role in the
establishment and government of this new regime. As Foucault warned, academia is therefore not
‘gulag on the insidious scale of capitalism’ (2010: 131), in any simple transposition, but the
university is coming to manifest a contemporary aspect of that totalitarian rationality realised in
Gulag as a strategic vertex on the terrain of historical capitalism.
So it is not simply a matter of the university reflecting phenomena of an external and broadly
social provenance, as is often presumed. The colonising rationalities of governmentality are not
Binvading^ the tabula rasa university and effecting transformation of academia in a socially
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normativemanner. Rather, due to the university’s emerging role in historical capitalism, it is being
transformed in accord with the axiomatic capitalist reconfiguration of the internal infrastructure of
the biopolitical population and its governmentality. This gives the University, and the struggles
unfolding across its surface, a strategic political importance in the confrontation with emergent
oligarchic class-power in capitalist society. But how is this struggle to manifest?
Continuous Control: The Meta-Disciplinary Devices of Gulag
In camp it is not the small ration that kills but the big one
(Solzhenitsyn 2007b: 208).
So how does this biopolitical meta-disciplinary technology of intellectual labour work out?
What are the ‘driving-belts’, and how dowe feel it ‘on our pelts’?What canwe say of thisRegime
(Rhezim) of Gulag-Academia, the ‘rules for living’ by which we try to survive (Applebaum 2003:
185), the techniques and practices that are the ‘depths and details’ of this dynamic technology of
control? Perhaps the greatest contradiction in academia today is ‘our complicity in these
processes’ that produce the labouring self (Gill 2014: 24), and the move from prison to labour
camp, from discipline to government, from the techniques of docility to the practices of
proactivity. As we have seen, it is in prison that one is placed under the surveilling and punishing
panoptic gaze. This schema is inadequate in camp, and superannuated in the new governmental
technology of academic labour, where the prisoner is no longer under the gaze of authority, no
longer merely compelled, but impelled; first under the ‘malveilling’ gaze of fellow inmates/
colleagues, and then finally under one’s own psychological auspices. In this section, we shall see
some mechanisms of ‘governmental’ impulsion that have historical parallels in Gulag. Discipline
is still there (Evans 2004: 59), but the neoliberal university erects new meta-disciplinary forms of
control that are ‘governmental’ or ‘pseudo-pastoral’, like the move from prison to camp, and are
more effectively destructive of the individual intellectual spirit.
1. Self-Guarding/Self-Monitoring. In direct contrast to the confinement and regimen of
prison, there was a much greater liberty of the body in the Zona of camp (Applebaum
2003: 183). As Gulag realised its immanent rationality, ‘the guard supposedly surrounding
[the zeks] became ever more illusory, ever more unreal’ (2007b: 392–393), just as ‘power
at a distance’ in the educational institution becomes more remote and unreal in a system of
coercion bound, as were the zeks, by ‘invisible chains which kept the natives reliably in
their place’ (2007b: 393). It is precisely the seeming lack of hindrance to exit in academia
that resembles the parametric Zona of Gulag. This is a system strengthened and functional
only due to the zeks’ ‘universal submission and total surrender to their situation’ (2007b:
393). This is that marginal liberty of freedom of movement and choice in the disposal of
one’s time so celebrated by more sanguine commentators when discussing the move into
the biopolitical idiom and the labour flexibility discourse. This is the spurious liberty of
choice in which there is no real choice, one must run or die. Hobbes’ Choice, and its side-
lining of the will, is nevertheless an essential device in the transformation from docility to
proactivity, and because of which the initial feeling of freedom on arrival in camp was
replaced by a growing realisation of doom, desperation and cynicism (Applebaum 2003:
184; Zarod 2006: 103). Our demoralisation in the academy is not the symptom of our
domination and our being bound to the technology of production and control; it is rather
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its very means. Academics today are increasingly subject to a kind of ‘self-exploitation’
and ‘inner immigration’ (Lorenz 2012: 620). These are the structures and techniques of
academic labour that manifest as an intimate ‘power at a distance’ that ‘contributes to our
own self-surveillance and monitoring’ (Gill 2014: 22).
It could be objected that, whereas everyone wanted to leave Gulag and no one could,
everyone wants to go to academia and no one wants to leave. However, this is not a
symmetrical statement. It is not that no one wants to leave the comforts of academia, a notion
that is highly problematic in itself,11 but that no one really can leave academia. At least, very
few can realistically leave once a considerable life commitment in time and energy has been
invested. A crippling opportunity cost would have to be paid. The point about the camp
metonym for capitalist governmentality is that the principal tactic of resistance in the enclosure
of disciplinary rationality, that of ‘escape’ (AWOL patient, army deserter, truanting pupil,
uncooperative psycho-analysant) is no longer possible due to the totalising and penetrative
power of the capitalist mode of production through meta-disciplinary technologies in the
society of control. Whither would an academic leave the university camp to go, if they were
not already in a socially and financially privileged position within that institution? Just as
innumerable prisoners of Gulag left camp only to hang around nearby in the so-called
‘Campside’ zone (Solzhenitsyn 2007b: 564–576), unable to restart a meaningful life in
Soviet society at large (arguably aGulag again on amore encompassing scale), so the academic
would most likely descend into para-academic activity more precarious and exploited than
before if they were to leave the academy proper. I also think that a more nuanced analysis than
there is space for here would demonstrate the structured stratification internal to the university
regarding satisfaction and contentmentwith status in that setting. For instance, ensconced senior
academics and precarious junior researchers doubtless have highly variable degrees of desire to
remain in the university on its current trajectories. To be a ‘trustie’/’thief’ in camp, on the one
hand, or a ‘slogger’/‘last-legger’, on the other, was to see camp’s attractiveness in very different
lights. Interestingly enough, it was the ‘thieves’ and ‘trusties’ in camp who demonstrated an
active desire to return to camp from ‘freedom’, in the case of the former, and a willingness to
remain within camp, in the case of the latter. This contrasts with the more understandably
common desire to leave camp amongst the general workers, even if it meant potential death.
It is precisely the prima facie openness and ease in the terms of entry/exit from the university
that recalls the apparent but superficial openness of the zona of camp. It ought also to indicate,
as in the reality of camp, the power ‘at a distance’ that intimately controls the terms of entrance/
exit from academia actually experienced.
2. The Differentiated Ration Pot was a distribution of supplementary food, and other means
of subsistence, amongst the camp prisoners conceived with the sole purpose of
incentivising percentages of output above 100 % of norm (those previously taken away)
(Solzhenitsyn 2007b: 155).
What a merciless knowledge of human nature! Neither those pieces of bread nor those
cereal patties were comparable with the expenditure of strength that went into earning
them. But as one of his eternal, disastrous traits the human being is incapable of grasping
the ratio of an object to its price (2007b: 155–156).
11 Rosi Braidotti has articulated a growing realisation in the human and social sciences that to flee the 21st




As with the similarly opaque and mystifying commodity device in capitalist society, this
really is the central device of camp control, and supplies us with a core principle of
contemporary academic labour control as it is now emerging. It also is the fundamental
mechanism for understanding the psychological woes of academic living. As a meta-
disciplinary device, it is couched in the ideological rhetoric of ‘competition’, but merely turns
the object of competition inward, penetrating and destroying the dignity of the individual.
Key to the functioning of the ‘differentiated ration pot’ is the tactic of Limitless
Postponement that one finds running right through so many topological features of the
Society of Control (Deleuze 1992: 5). For instance, it is limitless postponement of remuner-
ation, promotion and security of position that incentivises junior researchers to allow their
journal publications to be profitably published by presses without remuneration, on the
perpetually postponed promise that one day such publicationswill get them a salaried position.
Like the promise of early release from camp, such promises rarely materialise. However,
labouring in pursuit of ‘the big ration’, under endlessly postponed conditions of remuneration
and security, exploits our dedications and ‘eat[s] people alive’. Mary Evans rightly analyses
labour in the academy as
by its nature endless; the perfect study, the perfect explanation, the perfect book is
always waiting to be written. Place this specific imperative alongside Protestant
expectations about work as the route to heaven and a noxious cocktail of obsessive,
workaholic values is created (2004: 99).
However, through the ‘differentiated ration pot’, we can apprehend how the impelling
labour imperative of limitless postponement inheres to the very anatomical structure and
physiological systemic relations of the regime itself, and does not require any etiological
reference to wider cultural mores nor to ahistorical personal proclivities specific to academics.
Some exemplary technical instruments that erect the framework for this logicmight include
the tenure-track system, the widely distributed ‘publish or perish’ aphorism, résumé-building,
unpaid labour in teaching or the ratio of limited postgraduate funding pools to accepted
positions.
3. The Brigade of workers in the labour camps was a signal creation of the metastasis and
maturation of the productive apparatus of Gulag. Quite simply, work groups would be
organised with a Brigadier as chief, often with two such Brigadiers in order to stimulate
intra-brigade competition and enmity. In contrast to the isolation of disciplinary tech-
niques, the brigade offered a more intimately effective means of enforcing control on
labourers by the self-policing of the population of prisoners.
The brigade is clearly a disciplinary institution by descent (Herkunft), born of clearly
panoptic situations such as those where ‘hundreds of prisoners are clumped together in a
small area visible to the naked eyes of the supervisors, and hardly has anyone of them
stopped moving than he is immediately conspicuous’ (2007b: 156), such as at worksites
on the Belomor Canal. However, in inauspicious working conditions (remote postings,
few guards, dispersed worksites), how was control guaranteed? Much thought was
applied, and the brigade was invented; from disciplinary surveillance to meta-
disciplinary malveillance. The brigade augments disciplinary power with the new meta-
disciplinary modality of power; it does not replace it.
In reference to the brutal mutuality of Bencouragement^ in the brigade, Solzhenitsyn
sarcastically remarked on ‘how the brigade serves the psychological enrichment of its
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members, the prodding, the surveillance, and the heightened sense of dignity’ (2007b: 157),
and how ‘consistent with the purposes of the brigade, worthy tasks and brigadiers… are
selected’ (2007b: 157). No longer a collegial band of fellow travellers, as in prison, but vicious
and suspicious rivals for the food of the differentiated ration pot. Bettelheim also noted the
highly effective meta-disciplinary work-group malveillance in Nazi labour camps contrived by
the SS through the key technique of always punishing collectively for individual transgressions
(Bettelheim 1943: 436, 452), and which functioned solely from the active complicity of a
decisive majority of the group (1943: 444).
Here, we have both the compulsion to adapt to situations and the notion of a seemingly
preferable form of ordering production, but simultaneously a greater penetration and inten-
sification of the stresses brought to bear on the individual in this new technology of labour.
Make live and let die. The result is a greater loss of our ‘souls’ (or for Bettelheim, ‘ego’)
through instrumental adaptation of one’s subjectivity to the alienated circumstances of
systematic control (1943: 431). After all, ‘what is there to which people cannot adapt? It
would be crude on our part not to look closely and observe how the brigade sometimes
became a natural constituent cell of the native society of the Archipelago, of the same kind
that the family is in freedom. I myself knew such brigades—and more than one too. True,
these were not brigades on general work—where someone had to die because otherwise the
rest could not survive’ (2007b: 157).
Instances of this include the intra-faculty competition for funding allocated from
centralised university decision-making, whereby faculty deans and institute directors become
brigadiers in the securing of means of subsistence for the brigade, and thus making of them
executants of police power rather than leaders of resistance. Similarly, the creation of internal
faculty or university publication databases establishes the structure of malveillance, whereby
the brigade of academic workers struggling tomeet the output for the differentiated ration pot
can see who the weak link is in the brigade, who threatens the subsistence of the whole, and
so who must be eliminated in the next round of cuts, sidelined from a share of the ration pot,
or otherwise ‘encouraged’ to buck up.
4. Then there is the ‘Socially Friendly Element’ (Solzhenitsyn 2007b: 92–93, 425–446).
These are those who are constituted as a social category and whose existence and
behaviour instrumentally serve the dominant power structure, deepening the rationality
of control and supervision that is necessary for the power of authority ‘at a distance’ to
function. In camp, they were the ‘thieves’, the historic Russian blatnoyie deemed in the
syllogistic Soviet dogma to be safely criminal rather than dangerously political, thrown in
with the politicals to ‘gnaw on their flesh’ and keep them in line through vampiric terror
(Solzhenitsyn 2007a: 502–512; 2007c: 291). As merely ‘the rear ends of the Bluecaps
[authorities, state police]’, the ‘thieves’ were a continuation of the machinery of oppres-
sion into the very tissue of camp life. They served to divide the politicals, individuate/
isolate them, and sap their will to organise and mutually support one another. Is this the
swelling rank of administrators today, taking their pick of the nicest campus buildings,
secure contracts, university budgets, and controlling the allocations of rooms and re-
sources to the academics, as the thieves did with the duffel bags and victuals of the
politicals at all and every encounter in the camp system?
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5. The Trusties (pridurki) were those who accepted privileged positions in camp. They were
tempted or induced ‘into collaboration with the repressive system, raising them above the
others, and granting them privileges which allowed them, in turn, to help the authorities exert
their power’ (Applebaum 2003: 331). These were the subaltern strata of work assigners,
clericals, orderlies, kitchen staff, personal attendants, etc. The trusties did not kill or torture in
Gulag, but they ‘participated in a system that forced prisoners to work to their deaths’
(Applebaum 2003: 336). In academic terms, those who occupy ‘trustie’ positions in univer-
sity departments, faculty boards, etc., are often well-meaning people with their own profes-
sional problems, but by accepting their privileged position and executing their function in
that position, they are enablers of a system of ‘power at a distance’.
There are many motivations to assume such positions, but the physiological dynamic of
‘make live and let die’ turns such a decision into one of vocational survival. In long-term
conditions of retraction and retrenchment, this is a survival systemically at the expense of
others. Further, trusties tended to be selected from the ‘socially close’ elements (thieves),
just as in academia where they tend to be selected from the least critical, the least theoretical
and themost rationally ‘disciplined’, as theymove towardmore acceptable ‘entrepreneurial
and scientific criteria’ in their orientations (Brown 2011: 128). For those who consider this
a harsh personal judgment, it is not one I hold in isolation. For Mary Evans, ‘the eager
recruits to law and order who have made possible every fascist regime in history found a
civilian, and respectable, place for themselves in the QAA [a UK higher education
assessment body] and its endorsing institutions’ (2004: 126). Thus, universities seem ‘to
contain at least enough people willing to learn to live to control others through new patterns
of surveillance’ (2004: 126), and this surveillance—as with the ‘thieves’—is suffocatingly
intimate, yet impossible to get hold of pro forma.
One hears often that to survive vocationally in the university today, one must ‘play the game’,
which is shorthand for complicity and collaboration in the rationality of capitalist governmentality
in academia. This is a predictable apologetic argument given that the majority of camp survivors
probably owed their survival to their complicity in reproducing the rationality of Gulag
(Applebaum 2003: 335), and survival in academia bears the samemark. However, in universities,
the administrator is increasingly more a role than a discrete personage, with academics more and
more taking an ‘admin’ route, since ‘career opportunities for the potential assessor are consider-
able’ in our times of assessment mania (Evans 2004: 35). To Primo Levi, the ‘hybrid class of the
prisoner-functionary’ constituted both camp’s ‘armature’ and its ‘most disquieting feature’ (Levi
1989: 27). Likewise, multiplying the cadre of administrator-academics is to turn living Labour
against itself and ‘to encourage structures which quite explicitly endorse and reward competition
between individuals’ (Evans 2004: 119), between those who would otherwise organise a greater
solidarity of interest against the ‘socially friendly element’ and the authorities. But this tactic of
power can engender its dialectical opposite. Perhaps we should look to an alliance with the
‘thieves’, an alliance with those fractions of the administration that are increasingly subject to
domination, exploitation and precarity, just as those admin-academics amongst us seek ‘trustie’
positions in the power structure. Thus, we can create new lines of solidarity with the troubled
groups of disaffected office staff, interns, cleaners, caterers, etc. (Eve 2012). This strategy was
actually pivotal in the final defeat of Gulag in the 1950s (Solzhenitsyn 2007c: 307).
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Soul Mange? Techniques of Subjectification
We must open our eyes on the contrary to what enables people there, on the spot, to
resist the Gulag, what makes it intolerable for them, and what can give the people of the
anti-Gulag the courage to stand up and die in order to be able to utter a word or a poem
(Foucault 1980: 136).
We have seen how the relative ineffectiveness of disciplinarity as a modality of power lies
in the surplus entailed in the activity of that power as realised through its techniques.
Resistance is engendered by power itself in its operation and realisation (Foucault 1991a:
201). The relative effectiveness of meta-disciplinarity in capitalist governmentality stems from
the apparent absence of such a surplus in this modality. As such, resistance to power cannot
rely upon the surplus of disciplinary power to provoke or establish the terms of resistance. A
modality of power predicated on ‘proactivity’ must be met with a resistance characterised by a
heightened sensitivity that takes the initiative and creates the conditions of possibility for its
own practices of counter-conduct. It is precisely this misapprehension that probably explains
the dumbstruck inability of academics, accustomed as they are to thinking through disciplinary
power, to begin even to imagine strategies of resistance, or properly counter-conduct, to the
modality of capitalist governmentality. This is where we are.
We have been concerned with the effects of the transfiguration in the governing operations
of academic life and labour and ‘by what this does psychosocially to us, how it produces new
structures of feeling in the academy’ (Gill 2014: 22). For Solzhenitsyn, the labour camp
produced ‘soul mange’ (2007b: 621–622, 640), a fundamental corruption of the human
character. We can extend or reduce this concept and speak of ‘intellectual mange’. We hear
so much of academic researchers who increasingly have ‘felt spiritually and ethically bank-
rupt’ (Sparkes 2007: 521). This is a reformulation of the industrial pathology of capitalism that
forces the individual to internalise the productive apparatus, moulding the worker’s personality
and subjectivity for purposes of command and organisation (Virno and Hardt 1996: 133),
resulting in ‘inner immigration’ and self-exploitation (Lorenz 2012: 620), and the
territorialised hijacking of a libidinal economy subjectivised. One recalls in this capitalist
pathology Marx’s ‘manufacturing moment’ that ‘converts the worker into a crippled mon-
strosity by furthering his particular skill as in a forcing-house, through the suppression of a
whole world of productive drives and inclinations’ (Marx 1990: 481). However, it is not so
much a suppression, as a formidable mobilisation with which we now must reckon.
The original panopticon of Bentham was conceived on a utilitarian principle of improve-
ment, as an ‘articulation of an Enlightenment philosophical idea as well as marking a changing
paradigm in social reform from physical punishment to visual control’ (Chapman and Ostwald
2006: 1). The apparatuses of capitalist governmentality in the society of control have no such
imperative necessarily, and as the memory of the disciplinary fades, a ‘nightmare of a new
kind’ can increasingly dominate—a biopolitical community of expendable ‘collective individ-
uals’, who, if in refusal will not be ‘made live’, will rather be ‘let die’.
It is important to remember that Bentham’s panopticon was not derived merely as a
terroristic weapon of power and domination. The discipline and punishment occasioned by
disciplinary mechanisms was/is more than a sophisticated machinery of ever-greater potencies
of the sovereign’s revenge. It was conceived, taking the carceral system as an example, ‘in
order to organize good prisons, where people could be treated, reformed as in a disciplinary
institution’ (Foucault 1983). This is why Surveiller et Punir might have better been titled
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Surveiller, Punir, et Améliorer (To Discipline, Punish, and Improve/Better), granted with a
little conscious irony. Discipline as a mode of power was therefore always more than an
institutional typology, and more than a sum of the techniques of disciplinary power found in
those institutions, it was a ‘disciplinary system’ that is ‘much more a kind of rationalité than a
total institution’ (Foucault 1983). In this way, disciplinary rationality is entailed in govern-
mental rationality, swallowed and developed by it, furthered by it. Disciplinary rationality and
governmental rationality are variant modes, but are touched by the Enlightenment trope of
improvement: improvement of the Body (discipline), improvement of the Population
(government) and improvement of the Soul (pastorate). It is in this respect that both modes
are bound into the Dialectic of Enlightenment.
It is insinuated by some (Ewald 1991; Gordon 1991;McNay 1992: 61) that governmental power
offers an emancipatory trajectory in the genealogy of power in terms of personal liberty and
government of the Self. Disciplinary power ‘takes the form of an exhaustive surveillance of
individuals so that they are all constantly under the eyes of the sovereign in everything they do’
(as one can see in the 19th–20th centuries’ educational institutions), meaning that it is panoptic. On
the other hand, governmental regulation provides a ‘set of mechanisms that, for the government and
those who govern, attach pertinence to quite specific phenomena’ (Foucault 2007: 66), leaving a
broad range of activities and spaces quite untouched and free from interference. Power is experi-
enced less as a tangible and immediate command and control or intrusion for most people most of
the time in the discursive field on which power works. Rather than being disciplined and punished,
mechanisms like internalmarkets, rankings and assessment exercises supply incentives and rewards
to operationalise and mobilise those behaviours of individuals that are biopolitically favoured.
In the carceral archipelago of Gulag, what we are witnessing is a rationality bereft of the
theme of improvement through disciple or pastoral government. These have been replaced,
within particular apparatuses of governmental rationality, by the vengeful power of the sover-
eign affirmed at multiple points by spectacular violence and a telos of annihilation driven by the
accumulation imperative of an axiomatic capitalism ‘occupying the position of the sovereign
without dispensing any meaning’ as tyrannical primum movens of Gulag (Holland 1998: 67).
However, in the camp paradigm, one can no longer truly say of this machinic capitalism (that
‘sits mute on the throne of the sovereign’) that ‘what is owed is merely one’s work, one’s
quantified labor-power rather than one’s life’ (1998: 67). On the contrary, in the biopolitical
community, what is owed by the ‘collective individual’ is its labour-power and its life. Failure
to pay the debt of one (to be ‘made live’ through labour) is to forfeit the other (to be ‘let die’).
One suspects that this missing link in the history of Gulag helps to explain the fairly
impoverished lifespan of the institution in world historic terms and its ultimate demise rather
than dialectical transcendence. A crucial component in the rationality of the Dialectic of
Enlightenment was missing. There was no improvement (even if understood in merely
instrumental terms), no ‘ascent’, only ‘corruption’. If a new technology of labour is being
established in the university according to a similar governmentality operative to the logic of a
sovereign imperative of capital accumulation, serious questions arise.
So is it sufficient merely ‘to make a shelter for oneself’ (Levi 1989: 25), to develop an
ahistorical and cynical survival niche lodged perennially at the end of history in The Grey Zone?
There may be no dialectical teleology to History, but that does not invalidate dialectical thinking,
nor does it preclude an appreciation of the dialectical relations between things. The aim here is not
simply to combat ‘the cop in the head’, or the rot in the soul, but to apprehend and engagewith the
material techniques and practices that every second reconstitute what Rancière calls ‘the new
terrors and manipulations of powers’ (2012: 123). Are we to bow before the instrumental
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rationality and to accept that ‘the best society, then, will be the one that exempts the power of
thinking from the obligation to obey’ (Deleuze 1988: 4), not merely for the philosopher but for
the intellectual wellbeing of us all? Is such an interstitial niche a requisite for the survival of the
‘soul’? What if to think is to desire, and to desire is to think? Are both then subordinated; both
rendered obedient to the imperatives of being ever more productive/anti-productive?
As academics, we seek for the sophisticated analysis of power, we value subtlety and we crave
intellectually legitimatising and justificatory argument for what we do. However, politically, this
puts us in poor stead, and I follow Rancière’s post-68 realisation that it is fatal to over-theorise
resistances. We therefore fail to see that this academia of the governed is as ‘a game that had its
rules, a conspiracy with its mode of circulation, a Bhappy war machine^’ (Rancière 2012: 124).
So, as such, ‘against the army of power it is always necessary to set in motion a kind of war
machine, but also—and there is nothing sad about this—that rebellion has no legitimacy, simply a
logic’. In that logic, ‘there is never in the last instance any other alternative than to obey or resist
power’ (2012: 123), and there is no cunning of reason, historical necessity nor sociological
category that will provide an answer. I suspect most of us who get this far already know the
answer and need not puzzle over ‘what is to be done?’ It is that which comes least naturally to the
cerebral: refusal, risk, courage and a willingness to die… professionally.
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